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The pace of change in public land law has been dizzying over the
last ten years. To be sure, we have seen a decade of rapid development
in many areas of the law. But public land law has undergone a com-
prehensive reformation that sets it apart. Basic tenents have been re-
jected or reshaped, and new congressional and judicial premises have
been established. This article examines some of the forces that caused
this evolution, identifies several of the central concepts in the field to-
day, and attempts to assess probable further developments in the essen-
tial doctrines of public land law.
We can gain perspective on where the field is, and where it is go-
ing, by looking at public land law as it stood ten years ago. In 1970, the
Public Land Law Review Commission was nearing the end of its task.'
Much of its time during early 1970 was spent on chapter 4, Environ-
mental Protection. This chapter on environmental issues was one of
* Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Oregon. B.A. 1963, Deni-
son University; LL.B. 1966, Stanford University. The author appreciates the several sugges-
tions that have been made by George Cameron Coggins, Ralph W. Johnson, David H.
Getches, Robert G. Mullendore, and Derb S. Carter. Special thanks to John Henry Dudley,
Jr., who first kindled my interest in the American West.
1. The Public Land Law Review Commission was established by Congress in 1964.
Act of Sept. 9, 1964, P.L. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982. The Commission was directed to study ex-
isting statutes, to review the policies and practices of agencies administering public lands, to
compile data to determine present and future demands on public lands, and to make recom-
mendations on modifications in the laws and policies so as to provide maximum benefit to
the public from the public lands. Id. at § 4. The Commission was terminated when its work
was reported in the volume, UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAND LAW REvIEW COMMISSION,
ONE-THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC Report].
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the last additions made by the Commission.'
The environmental chapter was not treated at the last moment be-
cause of some intrinsic defect in the Commission. Instead, the Com-
mission was reacting to the surge of environmental activism that did
not peak until the late 1960's. Certainly, environmentalists had ob-
tained some major victories on the public lands during the 1960's; the
best example was the Wilderness Act of 1964.1 But broad-based public
awareness had not previously focused on the public lands.
The Public Land Law Review Commission's report, which may
have had considerably more impact that its critics would admit,4 is
something of a museum piece today because many aspects of modern
public land law barely existed, or did not exist at all, when the report
was fied in June, 1970. In 1970 there were thousands of laws relating
to the public lands on the books. The great bulk of those laws, how-
ever, were characterized by broad delegations of authority to land man-
agement agencies. Leading examples are the Forest Service Organic
Act of 1897,1 the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934,6 and the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 1964.7 There were relatively few statutes that
set administrative standards and prohibitions in the style of modern
legislation. The National Environmental Policy Act,' called the "Sher-
man Act of environmental law,"9 did not become effective until Janu-
ary 1, 1970 and other major federal legislation followed during that
decade.10
Today there is a large case load of public lands litigation involving
major public issues, but this kind of litigation is a recent development.
2. R. JOHNSON, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COM-
MISSION 44 (1975) (unpublished manuscript) reprinted in G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 64 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON]. This is not to suggest that the Commission
had ignored environmental issues during the early years of its work; rather, the necessity for
environmental study had been identified but "it was necessary to have a much larger study
in environment than had been contemplated." Pearl, Discussion: Introduction and Overview,
VI LAND & WATER L. REV. 33, 37 (1970).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976).
4. As Professor Johnson explains, federal land management agencies administratively
adopted many recommendations in the report. See R. JOHNSON, supra note 2. In addition,
the PLLRC Report provided much of the impetus for the adoption of the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 and scattered sections of 7, 10,
16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 48, 49 U.S.C. (1976) [hereinafter referred to as FLPMA]. See generally,
Muys, The Public Land Law Review Commissionr impact on the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIz. L. Rv. 301 (1979).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§473-478, 479-482, 511 (1976).
6. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1976).
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4361 (1976).
9. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 697 (1977).
10. See, e.g., notes 31-38 infra.
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The Bureau of Land Management, for example, had virtually no "pub-
lic" litigation before 1970. The BLM has always had a substantial case
docket, but traditionally it consisted almost entirely of private litigation
involving individual rights to mining claims, mineral leases, grazing
permits, and homestead patents. The historic lack of public-issue liti-
gation is even more pronounced in the Forest Service. As of 1970, the
Forest Service had appeared in the Supreme Court on anything ap-
proaching a major policy issue only once" since Light v. United
States2 was decided in 1911. Moreover, it appears that the first in-
junction ever issued against Forest Service activities in any reported
case was handed down by a district judge in Colorado later in 1970.'1
The paucity of cases raising major public issues is due in part to the
fact that most of the highly successful environmental law firms were
recently founded-the Natural Resources Defense Council in 1969, the
Environmental Defense Fund in 1969, the Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund in 1971, and the Resources Defense Division of the National
Wildlife Federation in 1971.
Thus, as of 1970, public land law was a field stamped with broad
administrative discretion. The public, the courts, and even Congress
had asserted little institutional power.
The status of the public lands in Alaska, the largest public lands
state,' 4 was markedly different in 1970. The initial discovery of oil at
Prudhoe Bay had just been confirmed.' 5 Furthermore, the claims of
the Alaska Natives had not yet been resolved, with the result that the
United States had not yet "cleared" title to its immense holdings in
Alaska.' 6 In the lower forty-eight states, the federal government had
11. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
12. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
13. Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), afd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th
Cir. 1971).
14. Excluding off-shore lands, the United States today owns about 740 million acres or,
as is commonly said, approximately one-third of the nation's total land area of 2.3 billion
acres. About 365 million acres, or slightly less than one-half of the total federal holdings,
are located in Alaska. See generally, G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 23-29.
15. M. BERRY, THE ALASKA PIPELINE 1 (1975).
16. When the United States acquired land from foreign nations by treaty, it obtained
less than fee title to those lands. Most land within the continental United States was subject
to "Indian title," or the right of Indians, including Alaska Natives, to occupy their aboriginal
land. Indian title can be extinguished by the United States, and the extinguishment can be
made without the requirement of paying compensation under the Fifth Amendment, but
Indian title is good against all parties other than the federal government. Transactions by
Indian tribes, without approval of the United States, are void. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976)
and Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 503 (1823). These principles are the basis for
the land claims of several eastern tribes and formed the basis for Alaska Native claims
before 1971. See generally, Clinton & Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints
on Alienation of Indian Land- The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 MAINE L. REv. 17
(1979).
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been relatively assiduous in settling most Indian title questions through
treaties or other means by the early twentieth century.17 Few legal de-
velopments in public land law are so dramatic as the policy void that
caused the United States to wait more than a century after the Treaty
with Russia of 1867 before resolving the legal claims of the Alaska Na-
tives.
The events in public land law during the last ten years have
changed much of this. The era was unsettling and disruptive; old poli-
cies were discarded and institutions were fundamentally altered. Many
observers would complain that the main features are red tape and delay
that have seriously impaired prompt and efficient administration.
Others view the period as being a progressive one in which outmoded
policies were replaced and administrators were forced to become more
responsive to public concerns. Still others, including this writer, see the
era as a time of consolidation that has resulted in a more unified and
comprehensive approach toward managing the diverse resources on the
public lands. Whatever value judgments one may draw, the sweeping
nature of the reordering cannot be denied.
The courts became involved in public land management issues
with a vengeance. In part the judiciary was implementing court deci-
sions, not involving the public lands, interpreting the Administrative
Procedure Act. 1 Important to that broader development were statutes
allowing for more liberal judicial review of all federal agencies 19 and
amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, itself a part of the
APA.2 ° The 1970's produced public lands litigation of a kind never
seen before: controversy over the Alaska pipeline,"' the Alaska lands
17. Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 16. Recent study, however, has disclosed many situ-
ations in which Indian title may not have been effectively extinguished. See, S. REP. No.
569, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
18. The judicial review provisions of the APA are found at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
A leading case is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). On
developments in administrative law during the modem era see Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
19. Several important amendments were made to the APA in 1976. A complaint today
may be directed simply against the United States or the administrative agency; individual
officers may be named, but it is not necessary to name them or, therefore, to substitute
names as officials change positions. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976). If an injunction is issued, how-
ever, it may be directed to a named official, even if that person was not originally named as
defendant in the action. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). Sovereign immunity of the United States
was waived for most purposes. Id. See also, S. REP. No. 94-996 ON S. 800, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976). Access to federal courts was also increased by legislation in 1976 eliminating
the $10,000 minimum amount in controversy in federal question cases involving review of
federal agency decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
21. See Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
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withdrawals, 22 national clearcutting policy, 23 national wilderness pol-
icy,24 policy dealing with off-the-road vehicles on the public domain,
2
"
grazing policy, 26 endangered species,2' water resources development
policy, 28 and others. The environmental litigation also dealt with re-
gional and local issues to an unprecedented extent.29 Much of the liti-
gation during the period developed along lines that are already almost
classic: a national or regional natural resource law firm would bring
the action; the Freedom of Information Act would be used to obtain
information in bulk from the federal agency; expert witnesses from var-
ious disciplines would be used to provide an interdisciplinary ap-
proach; an injunction would be issued; and, finally, legislation would
be passed giving both sides "half a loaf' but requiring environmental
standards far exceeding those that existed when the issue first reached
the courts.30
Thus Congress has also become involved, and also with something
of a vengeance. The FLPMA of 197611 stands today as perhaps the
dominant statute in the field. The NFMA of 197632 was a fundamental
reform in on-the-ground forest policy. Wildlife issues have been ad-
dressed in a number of acts.3 3 Alaska lands were the subject of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 197 1.3 The Forest and Range
22. Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alas. 1978).
23. See West Virginia Division of the Izaak Walton League of American v. Butz, 522
F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
24. See, e.g., Parker v. United States 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 989 (1972); Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envir. L. Rep. 20071 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
25. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Morton, 393 F. Supp. 1286 (D.D.C.
1975).
26. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829
(D.D.C. 1974).
27. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
28. See, e.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); County of Trinity v.
Andrus, 438 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
29. See, e.g., Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th
Cir. 1976); Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908 (D. Ore. 1977).
30. Examples of this phenomenon are numerous. For example, the injunction against
clear-cutting in West Virginia Division of the Izaak Walton League of America v. Butz, 522
F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975), led to the adoption of the National Forest Management Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NFMA], which allowed clear-cutting but required a wide variety of environmen-
tal controls. See generally, Hines, Monongahela and the NFMA of 1976, 7 ENv. LAW 356
(1977). After the issuance of permits for the Alaska Pipeline was enjoined, Wilderness Soci-
ety v. Morton, supra note 21, Congress extended the width limitation that had been the
subject of the litigation but also added new provisions concerning environmental protection
and public participation. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
3 1. See note 4 supra.
32. See note 30 supra.
33. See generally, M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1977).
34. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1976).
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Land Renewable Resources Planning Act of 197411 is not likely to be a
lawyer's act, but it offers the hope of improved long range forest and
range planning.3 6 Several individual wilderness acts have expanded
the wilderness system. 7 Important mineral leasing provisions were
adopted.38
Most of these acts share a common legislative philosophy. Their
central thrust is not to delegate broad authority to land management
agencies but rather to limit administrative discretion by requiring pub-
lic participation and establishing prohibited acts. If these statutes are
violated, there is ample basis for enforcement by the public in the
courts. This amounts to a reallocation of power from the agencies to
citizens, the courts, Congress, and the states.
Public land law will always be dominated, as it is today, by the
land management agencies. The quantum of the power shift away
from them can be seen as slight. But the subtle movements away from
administrative absolutism are significant. Decisions today are made in
different ways and are affected by different forces. We are guilty of
understatement if we fail to recognize the scope of the revolution of the
1970's.
There is yet another revolution, a quieter one, in public land law
today. It is a movement toward cohesion, toward identifying concepts
that are common to all of the public lands and their resources. Histori-
cally, it could be said that there was no defined body of "public land
law." Separate attention was focused on the discrete bodies of law that
had developed around the specific "economic" resources on the public
lands-water, hardrock minerals, fuel minerals, forage, and timber.3 9
Today, public land law is a coalescing body of law, rather than a
loosely connected series of laws dealing with separate resources. Today,
for the first time, public land law is truly a field.
The remainder of this article will deal with some of the doctrinal
developments-in most cases common to all of the public lands and
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1610 (1976).
36. Judicial review under the Resources Planning Act is likely to be very narrow. Cf.,
National Wildlife Federation v. United States, 8 Envir. L. Rep. 20651 (D.D.C. 1978). On
the planning aspects of the Act see Note, The National Forest Service and the Forest and
Range Land Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, 15 NAT. REs. J. 603 (1975).
37. E.g., Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-237, 92 Stat. 40.
38. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(Supp. 1 1977); Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, 30 U.S.C. §§ 191, 201, 202,
204, 207, 208 (1976).
39. Traditionally, the "economic" resources listed in the text have commonly been re-
ferred to as "resources" on the public lands. Today, Congress has recognized at least three
additional resources on the public lands-wildlife, recreation, and preservation. See notes
232-38 infra.
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resources-that have impelled the movement toward a unitary body of
public land law.
I. PREEMPTIVE CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY ON
THE PUBLIC LANDS
The starting date for the state-federal conflict over management of
the public lands might be fixed at 1872, when Yellowstone National
Park was established as a federal "pleasuring ground."4 Since then, as
the disposition of public lands has been replaced by a formal policy of
retention,4 t tensions between state and federal governments have stead-
ily mounted. Today, we are in a full-scale imbroglio in the eleven
western states and Alaska.4 z
One nub of contention is the nature and extent of federal power
over the public lands. Essentially, those supporting states' rights and
the "Sagebrush Rebellion" base their position upon what can be called
the "traditional" view of federal powers.43 This viewpoint assumes that
the United States' powers on most of the public lands are the limited
powers of a proprietor, or property owner, not a sovereign. Although
the federal government can always exercise the enumerated constitu-
tional powers it has over all the geographic area of the United States,
44
the United States would have no general sovereign police power to leg-
40. 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
41. The leading history on the evolution of public land law is P. GATES, HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968), which was prepared for the Public Land Law
Review Commission. See also S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY (2nd
ed. 1980); G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 83-248. Retention of lands in
federal ownership was formally declared as federal policy in 1976 in the Declaration of
Policy in FLPMA: "[T]he Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that the
public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a result of the land use planning
procedure provided for in this Act, it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will
serve the national interest ...." 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1976).
42. The "Sagebrush Rebellion" is a movement that seeks to divest federal ownership
over much of the public lands, or at least to increase substantially state control over public
lands. See generally, G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 117-31. A great
amount of research is presently being conducted by the states and by scholars on the subject.
Apparently several theories are being developed, including: (I) public lands passed to the
states at the time of statehood pursuant to the "equal footing" doctrine; (2) title did not pass
to the states immediately at the time of statehood, but the Property Clause, U.S. CONsT. art.
IV, § 3, cl. 2, requires that the federal government develop a program to dispose of the
federal lands within a reasonable time; (3) the "equal footing" doctrine is not violated per se
simply because some public lands are located within a new state, but the amount of public
lands in the western states is so great as to amount to a violation; and (4) the federal govern-
ment may constitutionally continue to own public lands, but the Constitution requires that
the states have greater control than is the case under current statutes. No attempt is made
here to evaluate those theories until research has been completed and published.
43. The best analysis is in Engdahl, State and FederalPower Over FederalProperty, 18
ARIZ. L. REv. 283 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Engdahl].
44. Engdahl, supra note 43, at 324-29.
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islate over all persons and activities on the public lands. Thus, al-
though federal laws are superior to those of the states under the
Supremacy Clause,a5 very limited federal sovereignty on the public
lands would mean that federal laws would seldom override or preempt
confficting state laws. Furthermore, the United States as a proprietor
would normally be subject to state laws on the public lands much like
other landowners.
This traditional model is based upon the juxtaposition of the two
dominant constitutional clauses affecting public land law, the Jurisdic-
tion Clause46 and the Property Clause. 7 Traditionalists argue the Ju-
risdiction Clause is the only basis upon which the federal government
can exercise sovereignty today. Further, they would conclude that the
Jurisdiction Clause can cover only a limited class of lands: they must
be lands acquired with the consent of the state and they must be used
for military bases or similar functions. Thus sovereignty could be exer-
cised by the United States only over a very narrow class of lands and
federal sovereignty could be established initially only with the consent
of the state. This would mean that federal sovereignty would extend
only to a small amount of federal land held as "federal enclaves."4"
45. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
46. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17:
The Congress shall have Power. . . To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession
of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall
be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings. (emphasis supplied).
47. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2: "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory of other Property belonging to
the United States. .. ."
48. Traditionally, federal jurisdiction on the public lands has been divided into four
categories: (1) "exclusive jurisdiction," where the state has ceded jurisdiction and has not
reserved any jurisdiction other than the right to serve criminal or civil process in the federal
enclave for litigation involving activities occurring outside of any federal enclave; (2) "par-
tial jurisdiction," where the state has ceded jurisdiction to the United States except for speci-
fied subject matter areas, such as the right to tax personal property and the right to tax
business activity; (3) "concurrent jurisdiction," where the state has ceded jurisdiction to the
United States but has reserved full concurrent jurisdiction; and (4) "proprietorial jurisdic-
tion," which refers to those lands over which there is no specific cession ofjurisdiction by the
states. As of 1969, there were 5.9 million acres under exclusive federal jurisdiction, 12.4
million acres under partial jurisdiction, 24.1 million acres under concurrent jurisdiction, and
728.1 million acres under proprietorial jurisdiction. Thus by far the greatest among of pub-
lie lands is not subject to any specific state cession. See generally, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION, REPORT PREPARED FOR THE
PUBLIC LAND LAW REviEw COMMISSION, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION (1969)
[hereinafter referred to as PLLRC JURISDICTION REPORT].
The approach used here is to divide federal jurisdictional holdings into two categories:
(I) federal enclaves, le., those areas subject to specific cessions by the states and (2) all other
federal lands. The first category would include areas under exclusive, concurrent, and par-
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Under this traditional model, the Property Clause is secondary
and minor. Federal governmental authority could only be exercised
during transition periods when territorial governments, not state gov-
ernments, existed on the public lands. Once statehood was granted,
governmental authority over almost all of the federal lands would be
transferred to the state by the operation of the "equal footing" doc-
trine.49 Under a more extreme reading of the Property Clause, the fed-
eral government is then required to dispose of the public lands within
the boundaries of the former territory to the state or to private citi-
zens.5 0 Obviously, the traditional model would mean broad state au-
thority and very limited federal authority.
It must be emphasized, as Engdah's thorough scholarship indi-
cates,5 that indeed this traditional model may have been what the
framers of the Constitution intended. The concept of sovereign juris-
diction is alluded to only in the Jurisdiction Clause.5 The Property
Clause, 3 on the other hand, first refers to the power of the federal gov-
ernment to "dispose" of this land, and can be read as providing for
federal sovereign authority only over territories.54 Thus this model
might well have reflected the original constitutional intent, although
tial jurisdiction for the reason that the issue in each case is to determine the terms of the
specific state cession. The second category would then be by far the largest, constituting
more than 90% of all public lands; the phrase "proprietorial" should probably not be applied
since the Supreme Court has found in Kleppe v. New Mexico 426 U.S. 529 (1976) that the
United States exercises governmental, as well as proprietorial, powers over such lands. See
generally, G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 249-315. Thus, as used here,
"federal enclave" refers to any federal area in which a state has expressly ceded some juris-
diction to the United States.
49. See generally, Engdahl, supra note 43, at 290-304, placing heavy reliance on Mayor
of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836) and Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 212 (1845). This approach assumes that western states cannot be on an "equal
footing" with the original thirteen colonies if there are large holdings of federal lands under
federal governmental authority since that situation did not exist in the original thirteen colo-
nies. "Equal footing" cases to date, however, have held that the doctrine requires only that
the new states have the same governmental powers as the original states. See, e.g., Coyle v.
Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566-67 (1911). See generally, Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of
States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519 (1951).
50. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF NEVADA, THE EQUAL FOOT-
ING DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION BY CONGRESS AND THE COURTS (1977). See also note
42 supra.
51. See note 43 supra.
52. The Jurisdiction Clause never uses the word 'Jurisdiction," instead referring to
Congress' "power to exercise exclusive legislation." See note 46 supra. The Supreme
Court, however, has treated the phrase "exclusive legislation" as being synonomous with
"exclusive jurisdiction." See, e.g., Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
53. See note 47 supra.
54. There is no question about the power of the United States to establish ierritorial
governments on open and unclaimed public lands before statehood. Simms v. Simms, 175
U.S. 162 (1899); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). Governmental
authority could then be transferred when a new state was created. See note 49 suprz.
1980]
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debates at the Constitutional Convention and other early interpreta-
tions are not especially illuminating.
5
The case law has not reflected the traditional view. Court deci-
sions over the last century have generally reflected and affirmed the
transition of congressional policy from disposal to retention. The im-
portance of the Jurisdiction Clause has greatly declined while the sig-
nificance of the Property Clause has vastly increased.
The Jurisdiction Clause is subject to five narrow constructions
which, taken together, would result in a very limited federal authority
on the public lands. Each of these interpretations, however, has been
rejected.5 6 First, because there is a reference to "consent" by the state
in the acquisition of land, the clause can be construed as allowing a
state veto over the acquisition of land by the federal government. That
construction was rejected a century ago when the Court held that the
federal government could unilaterally obtain land by eminent do-
main.57 Second, the Jurisdiction Clause, and thus the exercise of exclu-
sive jurisdiction and sovereignty in general, can be limited by defining
Jurisdiction Clause lands narrowly to consist almost solely of military
lands, dockyards, and federal office buildings.5 1 That construction has
also been rejected and the courts have found that the "other needful
buildings" reference should be expansively read in determining which
lands are properly subject to Jurisdiction Clause transactions. 9 Third,
the Jurisdiction Clause can be read as requiring exclusive federal juris-
diction and voiding transactions that provide for less than exclusive
jurisdiction. That interpretation has been rejected in decisions uphold-
ing the creation of enclaves involving various reservations of jurisdic-
tion by states.60 Fourth, the Jurisdiction Clause can be interpreted to
mean that federal enclaves can be established only on lands
55. See PLLRC JURISDICTION REPORT, supra note 48, at 4-17 and Engdahl, supra note
43, at 288-93.
56. On construction of the Jurisdiction Clause, see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, 254-56 (1978).
57. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876); United States v. Gettysburg
Electric Railway Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
58. The Jurisdiction Clause authorizes the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over the
District of Colombia and over "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings .. " U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
59. In James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) the Court found that locks
and dams were "other needful buildings" within the meaning of the Jurisdiction Clause,
reading the Jurisdiction Clause broadly to include "whatever structures are found necessary
in the performance of the functions of the Federal Government." Id. at 143.
60. Apparently all federal enclaves are subject to reservations by the states for the serv-
ice of civil and criminal process. See note 48 supra. Other cases have sustained much
broader reservations of jurisdiction in transfers under the Jurisdiction Clause. See, e.g.,
Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U.S. 186 (1937) (reservation of concurrent jurisdic-
tion by state). See also Collins v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938), quoted
in note 61 infra.
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"purchased" by the United States. This construction has also been re-
jected, and many federal enclaves not complying with the literal re-
quirements of the Jurisdiction Clause have been sustained.
61
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Jurisdiction Clause can
be read as being the only basis for the exercise of federal sovereignty on
the public lands, with federal power over all other lands being limited
to proprietorship. 62  That proposition seems to have been rejected
squarely in Kleppe v. New Mexico,63 which upheld broad federal gov-
ernmental powers under the Property Clause. The case is especially
noteworthy because it upheld federal preemption of state law in the
area of wildlife, long assumed to be subject to exclusive state jurisdic-
tion.64 In dictum, the Court went far beyond the facts of the case and
variously stated that the federal government possesses "complete
power,"6  "plenary power,' ' 66 "police power,' 67 "power. . . without
limitations,' 68 and "the powers. . . of a legislature over the public do-
main. ' 69 Kleppe thus completes the long evolution from the traditional
model, which would relegate all exercises of police power to Jurisdic-
tion Clause lands only, to a broad federal preemptive authority under
the Property Clause. The current importance of the Jurisdiction Clause
would seem to be very limited.
Kleppe could take any of several directions in the future. The opin-
61. The leading case on this point, and on liberal construction of the Jurisdiction
Clause generally, is Collins v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938), involving
the establishment of Yosemite National Park. The Court found that "the States of the
Union and the National Government may make such mutually satisfactory arrangements as
to jurisdiction of territory within their borders and thus in a most effective way, coopera-
tively adjust problems flowing from our dual system of government. . . . [The Jurisdiction
Clause] has not been strictly construed. . . . The clause is not the sole authority for the
acquisition ofjurisdiction." Id. at 528. See also, Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S.
525 (1885) (Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation); Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S.
439 (1929) (Hot Springs National Park); and Yellowstone Park Transp. Co. v. Gallatin
County, 31 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 555 (1929) (Yellowstone National
Park). This principle has been especially important in establishing exclusive federal juris-
diction in national parks; many of those parks involved cessions of jurisdiction by the states
to the federal government, but they did not come within the express terms of the Jurisdiction
Clause because in many cases the land was always within federal ownership and thus not
"purchased by the consent" of the state. As of 1969, the National Park Service held some
12.2 million acres as federal enclaves, i.e., under either exclusive or partial federal jurisdic-
tion. See, PLLRC JURISDICTION REPORT, supra note 48, at 163.
62. See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
63. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
64. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). After Kleppe was handed down,
Geer was overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
65. 426 U.S. at 540.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 539.
69. Id. at 540.
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ion could, as some commentators have urged, be overruled. 0 Kleppe
was apparently poorly briefed7 and can be criticized as a departure
from traditional doctrine.72 The overturning of this unanimous opin-
ion, however, is highly improbable since earlier cases have stood for
federal regulatory authority under the Property Clause;7 3 the somewhat
more expansive view of Federal regulatory power in Kleppe is no more
unusual than the evolution of the Commerce Clause.74 Second, Kleppe
could be confined and limited to its particular context. Most particu-
larly, the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 197115 in-
cluded strong, express congressional findings of compelling need for
the legislation 76 and was based on a powerful legislative history.7 7
Thus proponents of a relatively narrow federal power under the Prop-
erty Clause could argue in future cases for a "strict scrutiny" test that
would not be inconsistent with Kleppe.7 s
At the other extreme, the broad language of Kleppe could be taken
literally, and power under the Property Clause could be truly "ple-
nary" 79 and "without limitations."8 Such a reading is unlikely. Other
constitutional powers have been said by the courts to be "plenary," but
have been found to be less than complete upon further analysis in more
difficult cases."'
70. See, e.g., Engdahl, Some Observations on State and Federal Control of Natural Re-
sources, 15 HOUSTON L. REv. 1201 (1978).
71. Engdahl, supra note 43, at 351.
72. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
73. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); Hunt v. United States, 278
U.S. 96 (1928); Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
74. See generaly, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 128-
63 (1977).
75. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976).
76. The Court emphasized the Congressional Declaration of Policy that these animals
"contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the lives of the Ameri-
can people" and that the animals are "living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the
West." 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). 426 U.S. at 535-36.
77. For example, the legislative history expressly stated that the Act, which was
designed to protect wild horses and burros, was necessary because they have been "cruelly
captured and slain and their carcasses used in the production of pet food and fertilizer.....
[This bloody traffic continues unabated, and it is the firm belief of the committee that thit
senseless slaughter must be brought to an end." S. REP. No. 92-242, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1971). 426 U.S. at 536.
78. If narrowly read in this fashion, "Kleppe would be similar to the holding in Hunt v.
United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928), where the Court upheld the power of Forest Service offi-
cials to harvest game, in spite of state law prohibiting hunting, because of the Forest Serv-
ice's need to protect the forage resource in the area.
79. See note 66 supra.
80. See note 68 supra.
81. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall described
federal power over commerce as "complete" and "plenary." Id. at 196-97. Obviously today
the scope of the Commerce Clause remains extremely broad, see, e.g., note 74 supra, but
there remains some subject matter which is within interstate commerce yet beyond the reach
[Vol. I
1980] FIELD OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
A more likely analysis lies between those extremes. Federal exer-
cises of power over the public lands would not be absolute, but rather
would be required to have a rational tie to the development or preser-
vation of the federal land and resources.82 This more limited view of
the Property Clause would be complemented by a preemption test, dis-
cussed below,83 and it would result in exercises of federal power being
more narrowly read by the courts than the language of Kleppe might
indicate.
Important unresolved issues may turn on which view of Kleppe is
taken by future courts. An example is the question of whether the
Property Clause reaches activities not located on public lands, an issue
expressly reserved in Kleppe.Y In United States v. Brown,85 a federal
regulation prohibiting hunting was held to apply to nonfederal land.
Brown, however, was a relatively easy case because it involved a lake,
which the state claimed to own, inside of a National Park. A more
difficult question will focus around federal power over areas outside of
the exterior boundaries of public land holdings. Examples would be
federal statutes or regulations under the Property Clause exercising ju-
risdiction over herds of migrating wildlife during those seasons when
they are not located on public lands, regulating traffic on adjacent non-
federal lands, making rules concerning noise and air pollution on adja-
cent lands, and establishing federal "zoning" on adjacent private lands
near federal installations such as national parks and national seashores.
There are clear suggestions that federal power under the Property
of federal power under the Commerce Clause. National League of Cities v. Usery,426 U.S.
833 (1976). Similarly, cases under the Indian Commerce Clause have referred to federal
power over Indian affairs as being "plenary." See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553 (1903). Recently, however, the Court has noted that broad congressional power under
the Indian Commerce Clause "does not mean that all federal legislation concerning Indians
is . . . immune from judicial scrutiny ..... Delaware Tribal Business Committee v.
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977).
The Court in Kleppe relied upon numerous older cases standing for "absolute" or "to-
tal" federal power over the public lands. 426 U.S. at 539-41. While congressional and exec-
utive authority on the public land remains broad today, such older authorities should not be
taken literally because of stricter modern judicial review, see text accompanying notes 18-29
supra;, the decline of the political question doctrine, see, e.g., Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597 (1976); and the general judicial and congressional
movement away from administrative absolutism on the public lands, see text accompanying
notes 18-39 supra.
82. On the use of the rational relationship test to measure exercises of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause see L. TRIBE, CONSTrrUtJIONAL LAW, 450-53 (1978).
83. See text accompanying notes 117-49 infra.
84. 426 U.S. at 546.
85. 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5 (9th Cir.
1979). The court in Lindsey held that federal regulatory authority extended to individuals
who violated Forest Service regulations notwithstanding the fact that the violations occurred
on state land. The violation occurred completely within the exterior boundaries of the na-
tional forest on the bed of a navigable river owned by the state of Idaho.
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Clause can be extended to non-federal lands, but there is no definitive
rnling.86 The Commerce Clause, by analogy, has been held to extend
to trade that was concededly not within interstate commerce; the
Court's reasoning was that the trade had an impact on interstate com-
merce and was thus subject to federal preemptive power.87 It would
follow that the Property Clause supports federal regulatory authority
over non-federal lands if there is a rational basis for controlling those
activities in order to preserve and protect federal lands and resources.
Although several issues remain to be resolved, the broad outlines
of federal authority in public land law have been settled. Federal au-
thority includes governmental power and is not limited to the rights of
a property owner.88 Federal sovereign authority can be exercised pur-
suant to the Property Clause, which encompasses all of the public
lands, and not just pursuant to the Jurisdiction Clause, which covers
only a limited number of federal enclaves.89 Although no case has
finally resolved the longstanding dispute between the legislative and
executive branches, it seems certain that federal power over public
lands is lodged ultimately with Congress under the Property Clause,
not with the President.90 Congress' power is preemptive and overrides
86. See, e.g., id.; Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); United States v. Al-
ford, 274 U.S. 265, 267 (1927). Federal regulatory authority off the public lands is discussed
in Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MiCH. L.
Rv. 939 (1976).
87. In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court upheld congressional regula-
tion of production of wheat by a farmer not iniolved in interstate commerce, because such
wheat "competes with wheat in commerce." Id. at 128. See also, Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
88. See text accompanying notes 62-69 supra.
89. Id.
90. In United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), the Court upheld an
executive order by President Taft withdrawing some three million acres of public lands from
mineral entry. There was no express delegation of authority from Congress to the President.
The government argued that the President had such power as Commander in Chief, U.S.
CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and as a matter of inherent executive power under. U.S. CONST.,
art. II, § 1, cl. 1. The Court refused to consider the matter of whether the President had such
constitutional authority under Article II. 236 U.S. at 469. The withdrawal, however, was
upheld on the notion that Congress had never objected to such withdrawals and that its
silence amounted to "acquiescence" of such executive withdrawals. Id. at 469-72.
Even after the passage of the Pickett Act in 1910, 43 U.S.C. §§ 141-143 (1964), the
Attorney General found that the Pickett Act limited the President's authority only in regard
to temporary withdrawals, and that the President could continue to make permanent with-
drawals without statutory authority. 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 73 (1941). When FLPMA was
passed in 1976, Congress included a provision to "repeal" any implied authority of the Presi-
dent to make withdrawals pursuant to the reasoning of Midwest Oil. See § 704(a) of
FLPMA, supra note 4. No case has ever affirmed inherent constitutional authority of the
President to make withdrawals. See generally, Wheatly, Withdrawals Under the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. Rav. 311 (1979). See also, Portland
Gas & Electric Co. v. Kleppe, 411 F. Supp. 859 (D. Wyo. 1977).
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inconsistent state laws pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.9' Finally,
since congressional authority can validly be delegated to administrative
agencies, a state law can be preempted by a validly adopted adminis-
trative regulation.92
These conclusions, which parallel the development of the Com-
merce Clause, are not likely to change. However, we are in an era of
"co-operative federalism," and that policy, coupled with the politics of
the "Sagebrush Rebellion," may well mean that Congress will grow
increasingly reluctant to exercise its authority on the public lands. In
addition, as the following section will indicate, the courts may adopt a
judicial approach which narrowly construes federal statutes and regula-
tions when the preemption of state law is involved.
II. STATE POLICE POWER ON THE PUBLIC LANDS
Historically, state laws have not been thought of as a major force
in the development of resource policy on the public lands. The focus
has been on the federal agencies and on private interest groups that
have developed resources on the public lands. Today the states are
moving on several fronts to extend their laws to the federal lands. Gen-
eral rules can and should be developed to help resolve issues of state
jurisdiction on the public lands.
The applicability of state laws can be approached by a three-step
question analysis. First, does the state action unreasonably interfere
with the administration of the public lands to such an extent that it is
barred by the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities? Second, is
the area involved a federal enclave and is the state law in question
excluded by the terms of the cession governing the enclave? Third, if
neither of the above applies, has the state law been preempted by fed-
eral law? As will be seen by the following analysis, each of these issues
has been construed in a manner allowing for relatively broad state au-
thority.
A. Intergovernmental Immunities
The Supreme Court in Fort Leavenworth A? A? v. Lowe,93 stated in
91. See generally, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); text accompanying
notes 62-69 supra and 117-49 infra.
92. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1976), the Court found that "[i]t has
been established in a variety of contexts that properly promulgated, substantive agency regu-
lations have the 'force and effect of law.' This doctrine is so well established that agency
regulations implementing federal statutes have been held to pre-empt state law under the
Supremacy Clause." Id. at 295-96. Many of the preemptive actions in public land law are
accomplished by means of agency regulations implementing general authority delegated to
the agency by statute. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977).
93. 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
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dictum that federal installations on the public lands must be "free from
any such interference and jurisdiction of the state as would destroy or
impair their effective use for the purpose designed."94 This was an
early statement, in the public lands context, of the doctrine of intergov-
ernmental immunities.95
Several cases have given content to the rule that states cannot "in-
terfere" with the federal lands and their management. Federal lands
and buildings may not be directly taxed by the states.96 State adverse
possession laws do not operate against the United States.97 State emi-
nent domain laws do not apply.98 Title to federal real property will
normally not be affected if federal employees engage in conduct that
might amount to laches or estoppel if those acts were done by private
persons. 99 State law can have no effect on federal employees carrying
out their duties, such as harvesting wildlife, l°0 in furtherance of federal
land and resource management objectives. 10 1
In several other cases, however, courts have decided that certain
state activities are not unreasonably burdensome and thus not prohib-
ited by the intergovernmental immunities doctrine. States may usually
tax private activities on the public lands.102 Recently, the Court went a
step further and allowed non-discriminatory local taxation of leasehold
94. Id. at 539.
95. The doctrine traces to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), strik-
ing down a discriminatory state tax on the Bank of the United States, where Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall made his famous statement "[t]hat the power to tax involves the power to
destroy. ... ." Id. at 431. Often the doctrine is analyzed largely in terms of federal immu-
nity from state taxes. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 367-74 (1978). The doctrine can, however, also prohibit state regulation not
involving taxation. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 391-401
(1978) and Engdahl supra note 43, at 371-76.
96. E.g., Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1876).
97. E.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
98. Eg., id.; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
99. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917). A
few recent cases have upheld private claims to land title on the basis of serious misconduct
by administrative officials. See, e.g., United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975);
Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970).
100. See, e.g., Hunt v. United States 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
101. State interference with activities of federal officials can be viewed as either an inter-
governmental immunity or preemption question. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 391 (1978).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964); United States v. City of De-
troit, 335 U.S. 466 (1958). The intergovernmental immunities doctrine "was once much in
vogue," Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 150 (1973), but modern cases have
seldom invoked the doctrine to bar state action. See Powell, The Waning oflntergovernmen-
tal Tax Immunities, 58 HARv. L. REv. 633 (1945); Ratchford, Intergovernmental Tax Immu-
nities in the United States, 6 NAT. TAX J. 305 (1953). A major reason for the infrequent
application of the doctrine is that the Court has found that private operations on federal
lands are not federal instrumentalities, so that such activities by private entities do not in-
voke the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities. Even in federal enclaves, which are
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interests held by Forest Service employees in public buildings on public
lands. 10 3 Furthermore, direct state regulation of a federal installation is
not per se impermissible if Congress allows the regulation.,"
Thus only a narrow range of state laws is barred as unreasonably
"interfering" with federal interests under the intergovernmental immu-
nities doctrine.105 In public land law, the doctrine seems to bar only
state taxation of federal property, state laws that directly affect title to
federal property, and state laws that would make illegal the conduct of
a federal official acting pursuant to a valid federal statute or regulation.
B. Federal Enclaves
If a state law is not barred by the intergovernmental immunities
doctrine, the next question is whether the land in question is designated
as a federal enclave. °6 Federal enclaves include military bases, certain
national parks, national monuments and similar installations, and
some federal office buildings. They amount to less than ten percent of
the public lands. 0 7 Apparently all federal enclaves were created with
the consent of the applicable state, although a broad reading of Kleppe
v. New Mexico' would suggest that exclusive federal jurisdiction
could be created unilaterally by Congress.' °9
Federal enclaves are governed by the terms of the cession ofjuris-
often not subject to state law, Congress has by statutes extended state law to many private
activities. See note 114 infra.
103. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977). The Court found that
"[t]he 'legal incidence' of the tax involved in this case falls neither on the Federal Govern-
ment nor on federal property. The tax is imposed solely on private citizens who work for the
Federal Government." Id. at 464.
104. See, e.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), upholding state restric-
tions on the operation of a federal reclamation project.
105. Modern opinions have typically used a preemption analysis, not the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunities, in determining whether state laws are valid as against private
activities on public lands. See notes 117-49 infra. In light of the decline of the intergovern-
mental immunities doctrine, see note 102 supra, and the increased reliance on preemption,
see notes 117-49 infra, this trend is likely to continue. Today, for example, courts might treat
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958), discussed in note 102 supra, as a
preemption case since the case involved a state tax on a private lessee of federal property.
106. Federal enclaves are defined here as any federal lands that are subject to a specific
cession agreement from the state. Thus federal enclaves include all of those areas which
have been described as being under "exclusive," "concurrent," and "partial" federal juris-
diction. See note 48 supra.
107. Id.
108. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
109. It has been directly held that exclusive federal jurisdiction may be established by
procedural methods other than those specified in the Jurisdiction Clause. See note 61 supra.
If, as stated in Kleppe, congressional power over the public lands really is "complete," or
nearly so, see notes 65-69 supra, then Congress may well have the power simply to enact a
statute establishing a federal enclave within a state. But it appears that Congress has never
acted in this fashion.
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diction from the state to the United States." 0 The Court has deferred
to the highly political nature of these jurisdictional accommodations
and has affirmed "arrangements" expressly made by the two sover-
eigns. I I'
Where the terms of the cession are not explicit the Court has been
generally liberal in allowing the application of state law on federal en-
claves. The Court has recognized that federal enclaves are not literally
extraterritorial to the states and that many state and local laws do in
fact apply in federal enclaves; the "fiction of a state within a state" has
been rejected." 2 There is sound policy for this reasoning: although
Congress has provided for a comprehensive criminal code in federal
enclaves by the simple and appropriate expedient of assimilating state
criminal laws," 3 no analogous comprehensive action has been taken in
regard to civil laws. Congress has by statute extended selected state
regulatory laws onto federal enclaves," 4 but many substantive regula-
tory areas have not been considered. The situation in private litigation
is even worse: state common law at the time of the cession ofjurisdiction
by the state controls until it is altered by Congress.' '
Thus the law on public enclaves is fraught with voids and archaic
provisions. The courts should, as seems implicit in most of the opin-
ions, liberally construe state reservations of jurisdiction as to federal
enclaves to allow for the development of a reasonably consistent, com-
110. See note 61 supra.
I11. Id.
112. See, e.g., Howard v. Commissioners of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 627 (1953); Evans
v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 421 (1970).
113. The Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), makes state criminal law ap-
plicable in federal enclaves if there is no relevant federal statute. The Assimilative Crimes
Act was held to be constitutional in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
114. The Buck Act allows states to collect sales, income, gasoline, and use taxes in fed-
eral enclaves, 4 U.S.C. §§ 104-110 (1976), although the Act does not permit taxation of the
United States or federal instrumentalities. See 4 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1976); United States v.
Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363 (1963). State unemployment laws, 26 U.S.C.
§ 3305(d) (1976), and workers' compensation laws, 40 U.S.C. § 290 (1976), also are extended
by statute to federal enclaves. See generally, Evans v. Cornman, 389 U.S. 419, 424 (1970).
115. In Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929), for example, the applicable
substantive law governing a law suit filed in the 1920's was found to be the law in effect in
1904, when the federal enclave was established. State law at that time provided for strict
liability of innkeepers for damage to personal property of guests due to fire. A 1913 state
statute, relieving innkeepers from strict liability and establishing negligence as the standard,
was inapplicable because state civil law at the time of the transfer in 1904 governed. The
reasoning is based upon a principle of international law "that whenever political jurisdiction
and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to
another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are intended for the protec-
tion of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government
or sovereign." Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 (1885).
See also Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture of California, 318 U.S. 285,
294 (1943).
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prehensive, and current body of law on federal enclaves." 16
C. Federal Preemption
The special body of law dealing with federal enclaves is inapplica-
ble to most public lands. The two major multiple-use agencies, the
Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, manage little
acreage in federal enclaves." 7 And it is on the remaining 90% or
more" 8 of the public lands not in federal enclaves where the difficult
state-federal issues will most often be raised, because it is there that the
various user groups most often collide over competing resource uses.
In those cases, the question is whether federal law has preempted state
law.
The leading case is Kleppe v. New Mexico,'1 9 where the Court up-
held the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971.12° As
noted, the case confirmed federal power on the public lands over wild-
life, an area traditionally left to state control.' 2 ' The Kleppe Court held
that the Property Clause gave Congress the power to preempt state
laws. As a result, New Mexico estray laws did not apply because the
1971 act had made other provisions for these strays.
On one level, Kleppe can be read to stand for drastically limited
state power on the public lands. The Court expressly analogized the
sovereign power of Congress under the Property Clause to that of the
states under the Tenth Amendment. 122 If read expansively, Kleppe
means that state police power is subject to federal preemption in over
one-third of the land area in the United States, plus adjacent areas. 123
The practical impact of Kleppe is not nearly as great as the above
analysis might suggest. Kleppe speaks only to the potential and theo-
retical range of congressional power. In fact, Congress has chosen to
exercise that power sparingly. There are, of course, severe political
constraints whenever any broad exercise of the power is considered.
Congress has more often deferred to state law on the public lands and
state law remains applicable when it has not been preempted by federal
116. The real burden to undertake reform, of course, is on Congress. The job of assimi-
lating state civil law into federal enclaves is a delicate one. For example, account must be
made for the proper operation of federal activities. Nevertheless, Congress should consider
the merits of an "Assimilative Civil Law Act," to resolve the current crazy-quilt. Congress
certainly has the power to pass such an act. See note 113 supra.
117. PLLRC JURISDICTION REPORT, supra note 48, at 163.
118. Id.
119. 428 U.S. 529 (1976), discussed at notes 63-83 supra.
120. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976).
121. See note 64 supra.
122. 426 U.S. at 540-41.
123.' The reach of the Property Clause over non-federal lands adjacent to public lands is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
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law. Thus substantive state laws apply to many private activities on the
public lands, and most controversies--criminal and civil-will be
heard in state court.124
Even on issues of resource management and allocation, Congress
has often deferred to state law. The basic structure of the Hardrock
Mining Law of 1872125 allows states to establish the basic elements of a
valid mining claim on the federal lands.126 Water law provides another
example of deference to state law. The great gold strikes occurred on
the public lands127 and water was necessary to develop those discover-
ies. When faced with private litigation over water rights, the courts
upheld the application of state law on the public lands.1 28 They were
correct: state law applies on the public lands unless it is preempted by
federal law, and there was no federal preemption as to water law in
those situations.129
124. On most of the public lands, state judicial and regulatory law will have wide appli-
cation. There is no federal question, for example, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) for the
purpose of federal judicial jurisdiction simply because public lands are involved. Thus 16
U.S.C. § 480 (1976), providing that states retain civil and criminal jurisdiction over national
forests, is probably surplusage. Unless there are intergovernmental immunities or a federal
enclave involved, see sections IIA and 1IB supra, state laws continue to apply until they are
preempted.
Federal enclave law should be considered a special circumstance applied only to a lim-
ited number of federal installations. Attempts by advocates to extend federal enclave law to
other federal lands has been a confusing factor present in a considerable amount of public
lands litigation. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541-44 (1976); State ex rel.
Cox v. Hibbard, 31 Ore. App. 269, 570 P.2d 1190, 1193 n. 5 (1977); and Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366, 368-69 (W.D. Okla. 1967), affirmed, 406
F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1969).
125. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1976).
126. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 24, 26, 28, 28b, 38 and 43 (1976). State laws are collected in
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, DIGEST OF MINING CLAIM LAWS (R.
Pruitt, Jr., ed. 1977). See generally, L. MALL, PUBLIC LAND AND MINING LAW, ch. 6-8
(1979).
127. See, e.g., R. PAUL, CALIFORNIA GOLD: THE BEGINNING OF MINING IN THE FAR
WEST (1947).
128. See, e.g., California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S.
142 (1935).
129. In California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142
(1935), the Court construed the Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976), as severing
any water rights that might have accompanied federal patents on non-navigable waters:
"What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters then
a part of the public domain became publicijuris, subject to the plenary control of the desig-
nated states. . . ." 295 U.S. at 163-64. Two earlier acts, not limited to non-navigable wa-
ters, had also protected existing water rights as against the United States, Act of July 26,
1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251, and as against subsequent patents, Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235,
§ 17, 16 Stat. 218. But these three acts leave numerous questions open. For example: What
law applied on the public lands before 1877? Or 18707 Or 1866? What law applies to
navigable waterways on the public lands? What law applies to public lands located in the
states not subject to the Desert Land Act? The anqwer on all counts (assuming that there is
no special federal action, such as a federal reserved water right, see note 222 infra) is that
state or territorial law, which often incorporated local customs, has always controlled be-
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Similarly, despite Kleppe, Congress has seldom preempted state
wildlife law on the public lands. Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Wildlife
Comm'n,130 is instructive. Montana required a $225 fee for out-of-state
big game hunters, while Montana residents were required to pay a fee
of only nine dollars. To a large extent, this licensing structure applied
to the public lands, because much of the hunting in Montana occurs on
the public lands. 1 ' The Court upheld the non-resident fee, in part be-
cause Congress had not enacted any contrary law to preempt the state
law. 132
Baldwin, rather than Kleppe, represents the actual situation con-
cerning on-the-ground wildlife management on the public lands. The
Endangered Species Act 133 and other special acts 134 are important, but
their impact on the total number of animals on the public lands is mini-
mal. State law applies to all other wild animals unless there is a con-
fficting federal law, a necessity since there are only 200 federal wildlife
enforcement officials compared to 6,000 state wildlife employees.
35
State wildlife law applies, with some exceptions, on national wildlife
refuges.' 36 FLPMA provides that state licensing laws will be respected
on Forest Service and BLM lands and that most state fish and wildlife
laws will continue to apply on the public lands.137 Thus federalpower
exists over wildlife on the public lands, but the federal power has been
sparingly exercised. Taking the public lands as a whole, state law re-
garding wildlife dominates over federal law.
The tradition of deference to state law in public land law may
prove to be important in analyzing preemption cases on the public
lands. 138 Although Congress sometimes spells out its intent to exclude
state law with some particularity, the tough cases involve questions of
whether Congress intended to override state law in specific instances
cause state law was never preempted. The three acts only confirmed existing law. See F.
TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW, REPORT PREPARED FOR THE NA-
TIONAL WATER COMMISSION 147b-147h (1971). Thus state courts were correct from the
beginning, see Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855), in applying state water law on the public
lands.
130. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
131. Id. at 390-91 n. 23.
132. Id.
133. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751.
134. See generally, Coggins, Federal Wildlife LawAchievesAdolescence.- Developments in
the 1970s, DUKE L. J. 753 (1978).
135. GOTTSCHALK, The State-Federal Partnershp in Wildlife Conservation in WILDLIFE
IN AMERICA 302 (Council on Environmental Quality 1978).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d) (1) (1976).
137. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1976).
138. On preemption generally, see Note, Pre-emption As -4 Preferential Ground- 4 New
Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959); Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the
Implied Federal Preemption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 295 (1977); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 376-404 (1978).
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when congressional intent is ambiguous or when there is no legislative
history at all. Rather than articulating a single general rule for pre-
emption, the Court has developed different rules of construction to re-
solve the questions involved in the many different bodies of law where
preemption questions arise.139 For example, the Court has been rela-
tively quick to find federal preemption in areas that are "traditionally
federal,"' 4 ° such as foreign affairs, 14 communications, 42 treasury reg-
ulations,1 43 and Indian law,'" where federal interests are sufficiently
ingrained that it may reasonably be presumed that Congress intended
broad federal power because of the historic pattern of federal
supremacy. 4  In other areas, the federal interest has traditionally not
been so pervasive and the courts have been more reluctant to find a
congressional intent to preempt state law."4 The Court seems to have
adopted a presumption in favor of state law in such subject matter ar-
eas when congressional intent to preempt is ambiguous."
These principles indicate that, except in those few cases involving
intergovernmental immunity or federal enclaves, public land law may
be an appropriate field in which to apply a presumption in favor of
state law when difficult preemption cases arise. Although there are nu-
merous examples of pervasive federal regulation, 148 traditionally Con-
139. Note, The Preemption Doctrine. Shiing Perspectives On Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
140. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
141. E.g., id. (registration of aliens); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (sedi-
tion laws).
142. E.g., Farmers Educ. & Corroborative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S.
525 (1959).
143. Eg., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
144. Eg., Bryan v. Itasca Co., 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
145. In addition to analyses that seem to be based upon the peculiar subject matter, the
Court has used other rationales, including a presumption in favor of federal preemption
when the national interest in uniformity is so strong that Congress will be deemed to have
"occupied the field." E.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
(labor relations); Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973, (aviation
regulation).
146. See generally, Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A Uni-
fied Method of Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 197 (1978).
147. An example is New York State Dept. of Social Service v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405
(1973), where the Court upheld state work rules conditioning receipt of federal AFDC bene-
fits upon fulfillment of an additional state requirement. The Court found a presumption in
favor of the state legislation: "If Congress is authorized to act in a field it should manifest its
intention clearly. . . .The exercise of federal supremacy is not likely to be presumed." id.
at 413. See also, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621 n. 4 (1978) (state retail
gas marketing law). As suggested, this presumption does not operate across the board; tradi-
tional federal subject matter areas, for example, would be excluded. See notes 140-44 supra.
The commentators, however, have properly noted a trend in favor of the validity of state
laws in preemption contexts. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives, 75
COLUM. L. Rav. 623, 651-54 (1975).
148. Federal regulation seems to be especially comperehensive in the area of grazing
[Vol. I
19801 FIELD OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
gress has often deferred to state law and has seldom chosen to exercise
the full reach of its power under the Property Clause. 149 Any presump-
tion in favor of state law would, of course, be obviated by express statu-
tory language, by clear legislative history, by valid administrative
regulations inconsistent with state law, by a compelling need for na-
tional uniformity, or by a statutory or regulatory scheme that occupies
the field.
III. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN PUBLIC LAND LAW
A. Judicial Review of Administrative Action
The courts, which have proved to be so important in the modem
era of public land law,'5 0 will continue to be called upon to make still
more major decisions over the next several years. Many older stat-
utes' 5 ' contain general language that will inevitably require interpreta-
tion in the context of current issues. Recent major legislation has
received little or no construction from the Supreme Court: examples
are the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act,'z the Wilderness Act, 53 the
Resources Planning Act,'5 4 the National Forest Management Act,
155
and FLPMA.
156
Many of the issues are likely to center upon the scope of adminis-
trative discretion. The Administrative Procedure Act provides general
guidelines, but in fact the courts have tended to develop different ap-
proaches toward different subject matter in different agencies. 57 In re-
policy, see note 6 supra; timber policy, see notes 32 and 35 supra and mineral leasing, see
note 38 supra and Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), afl'd,
100 S. Ct. 1593 (1980). Even in those areas, however, there may be room for federal regula-
tion on those issues not specifically addressed by federal statutes or regulations. See, e.g.,
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla. 1967),
affirmed, 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1969).
149. See text accompanying notes 125-37 supra. A recent case noting the deference to
state law in the area of water resources, describing it as "cooperative federalism," is Califor-
nia v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
150. See notes 18-30 supra.
151. See. e.g., notes 5-7 supra.
152. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976).
153. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976).
154. See note 35 supra.
155. See note 30 supra.
156. See note 4 supra.
157. The scope of judicial review of administrative adjudications is dependent on the
"substantial evidence" test, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). There is no indication that factual
determinations by administrative law judges should be reviewed in a different manner by
the courts depending upon the specific agency or subject matter involved. But only a small
percentage of administrative decision making is made in adjudications; policy is often devel-
oped by informal rule making and by far the largest amount of agency decisions involves
what Professor Davis calls "discretionary justice," involving neither adjudications nor rule
making. See generally, K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
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viewing adjudicatory action by land management agencies, courts
could adopt at least three different models of review, which might be
called Deferential Review, Neutral Review, and Trust Review.
Deferential Review would provide for limited judicial review of
decisions made by land management agencies. There are sound policy
reasons for according broad administrative leeway in this field. Public
land and resource decisions are heavily factual, often involving com-
plex economic, technological, and scientific issues; these are the kinds
of decisions that courts most often leave to administrative expertise.1
5 8
Many public land decisions support Deferential Review, the approach
taken by most courts prior to 1970.119 Furthermore, many would argue
(1969). The "substantial evidence" test does not apply to judicial review of informal rule
making or other administrative decisions not made in adjudications. Review of these other
classes of decisions often proceeds under the APA's rubric of "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is a general formulation of the notion that
courts must allow deference to agency decisions to which the test applies. But no single
definition of a standard of review is adequate to the task: federal administrative agencies,
the subject matter they deal with, and the varied kinds of decisions they must make (leaving
aside adjudications) are simply too diverse. Thus courts have implicitly refined the "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard by giving especially broad deference in areas involving com-
plex technological issues, national security, or old and respected administrative agencies.
Examples of subject areas involving broad administrative power, and concomitantly dimin-
ished judicial scrutiny, are: the admission of aliens, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Son Wong, 426
U.S. 88, 101 n. 21 (1976) ("The power over aliens is of a political character and therefore
subject only to narrow judicial review."); health, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); banking, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); military
affairs, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); prosecutorial discretion, e.g., Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 574 (1975) (brief statement of reasons to explain decision required,
but instances involving more substantial judicial review "should be rare indeed."); and for-
eign affairs, e.g., Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969). On the other hand, the
courts seem to have allowed less administrative discretion, and have engaged in greater
judicial scrutiny, where the issue involves, for example, public participation in the adminis-
trative process, e.g., National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.
1970) and Office of Communication of United's Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Indian law, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1973); free expression, e.g.,
McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971); and race, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d
1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The notion that federal judicial review of administrative action may
vary according to the circumstances is explored in Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional
Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 366, 377-95 (1968), and K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 551-56 (1972).
158. See note 157 supra.
159. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 E.L.R. 20292
(9th Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971); Dorothy Thomas
Foundation, Inc. v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. N.C. 1970). One doctrine that has
played a significant role in public lands litigation is that judicial review can be eliminated
entirely for those matters "committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
(1976). Many of those cases are collected in Comment, The Conservationists and the Public
Lands, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1200, 1236-42 (1970), although the Court has since found that
there is a presumption of judicial review and that review should be precluded only when
there is a clear showing of congressional intent. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560
(1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The pervasiveness
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that Deferential Review must be accorded to most complex administra-
tive decision-making since the decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.6°
Neutral Review means that courts would approach public lands
cases by analyzing only the words of the specific statute in question
without looking at the broader context of the field. There would be no
presumptions or biases in any direction. Neutral Review in many re-
spects is well suited to public land law. It is a heavily statutory field.
Many statutes were, in fact, adopted on an ad hoc basis without a view
toward the broader dimensions of the field; indeed, the inconsistency
and lack of unity in the field was a primary theme of the report of the
Public Land Law Review Commission.1 6 1 It was not until the Multiple
Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 62 and particularly the Resources
Planning Act of 1974163 and FLPMA of 1976,1' that Congress began a
serious drive toward order and unity in public land law. In this setting,
a good case can be made that courts should simply interpret each stat-
ute by itself, in a neutral way, without looking to the larger dimensions
of the field.
There is yet another approach, which can be termed Trust Review.
Such an approach would narrow administrative discretion and increase
judicial scrutiny based upon the public trust doctrine or upon analogies
to that doctrine.
The public trust doctrine traces its beginings to early Roman and
English law.' 65 It operated as a restraint on the Crown by placing limi-
of the notion that courts should play little or no role in public lands issues is evidenced in
one case, involving judicial review of afact issue in an adudication, where the government
made this argument in its brief: "[Tihe Secretary is the guardian of the public domain and
the administrative officer who must, by law, determine whether the congressional directives
have been complied with. . . . [Tihe finding of fact on this point is one within the exclusive
authority of the Secretary. This is not open to question." Stewart v. Penny, 238 F. Supp.
821, 826-27 n. 3 (D. Nev. 1965).
160. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Compare, e.g., Note, Administrative Law-Fermont Yankee
"Maximum Procedural Requirements" Rule, 27 KAN. L. RaV. 183 (1979) with Rodgers, A
HardLook at Vermont Yankee: EnvironmentalLaw Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L. J. 699
(1979). Professor Davis concludes that "the law in the long run will reject the Vermont
Yankee opinion and is even tending to do so in the short run." Davis, Administrative Com-
mon Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3.
161. See, e.g., PLLRC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 42 ("A Congressional statement of pol-
icy goals and objectives for the management and use of public lands is needed to give focus
and direction to the planning process."). The act establishing the Public Land Law Review
Commission specifically declared that a "comprehensive review" of public lands legislation
and regulations was necessary because those laws "are not fully correlated with each other"
and because administration of the public lands has been divided among several federal
agencies. Act of September 19, 1964, § 2, 78 Stat. 982.
162. See note 7 supra.
163. See note 35 supra.
164. See note 4 supra.
165. The public trust doctrine is explored in the influential article, Sax, The Public Trust
1980]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
tations on the granting away of rights to shores and rivers. Apparently
the public trust doctrine was not intended to be a restraint on Parlia-
ment, the legislature.' 66
In the United States, the public trust doctrine has developed sepa-
rately in different states as a matter of internal state law. 167 Federally,
the leading case is Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.168 Upon state-
hood, Illinois received title to the beds of navigable waterways pursu-
ant to the public trust doctrine. The state granted away more than
1,000 acres to the railroad company---"nearly the whole of the sub-
merged lands of the [Chicago] harbor."' 169 This extraordinary grant
was struck down as being contrary to the public's interest in the water
and land. Since navigable water and public trust lands are "held in
trust for the people,"17 the Court concluded that the grant was so ex-
treme that it amounted to an abdication of the state's responsibility.
There is uncertainty as to the application of the public trust doc-
trine to the public lands. One commentator has argued for a "public
land trust,"'' but a completely convincing case was not made. It is
true that the Supreme Court said in Light v. United States172 and other
early cases 173 that the public lands were held in "trust" for the people.
Those statements, however, were loose dictum and actually stand for
broad, not limited, administrative discretion.' 74 Cases relying upon the
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law. Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471
(1970). On the Roman and Common Law roots see 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS Ch. 3 (1967); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); MacGrady, The Navi-
gability Concept in the Civil and Common Law." Historical Development, Current Importance,
and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. STATE L. REV. 511 (1975); and 1 H.
FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 36 (1904).
166. Sax, supra note 165, at 476.
167. Authorities are collected in Sax, supra note 165, and W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, § 2.16 (1977).
168. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
169. Id. at 451.
170. Id. at 460.
171. Note, Proprietary Duties of the Federal Government Under the Public Land Trust, 75
MICH. L. REV. 586 (1977).
172. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
173. See, e.g., United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 28 (1940); Camfield v.
United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897); Knight v. United States Land Assn., 142 U.S. 161,
181 (1891); and United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890).
174. The essence of the public trust doctrine in public land law is that it would impose
responsibilities on administrative agencies or, more remotely, on Congress. The early cases
using trust language, however, upheld a broad federal power-especially in the areas of
protecting federal land and in disposing of federal land. See Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523 (1911) (power to prohibit unauthorized grazing by private parties on the public
lands); Camfield v. United States, 168 U.S. 518 (1897) (power to prohibit private parties
from fencing that would deny access of other private parties to the public lands); Knight v.
United States Land Assn., 142 U.S. 161 (1891) (broad power to dispose of federal lands);
and United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160 (1890) (power to dispose of
public lands). These cases, then, use the public trust--the public interest--to justify a virtu-
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federal trust responsibility for Indian lands are unpersuasive in light of
the early, special, and separate doctrinal development in Indian law.'75
Two important lower court cases' 76 involving the Redwood Na-
tional Park do squarely invoke the public trust doctrine as to public
land. That litigation, however, involved unique and extreme facts.
177
Further, the Redwood Park cases were based upon two strong statutes,
the National Park Service Organic Act 78 and the Redwood Park
ally plenary congressional (and administrative) authority on the public lands. There was no
suggestion that the public trust could be used to limit federal power.
175. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972), which has been cited to support a
public trust doctrine in public land law, involved the question of whether a 99-year lease of
Indian lands was subject to NEPA. The opinion included dictum that "all lands of the
United States are held by it in trust for the people of the United States." Id., 469 F.2d at
597. Davis and other Indian law cases, however, are not on point. The trust duty to Indians
was first set forth in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) and has since
developed as a highly specialized doctrine based upon the United States' unique obligations
to Indians. See generally, Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Resfponsibility
to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213 (1975). There is no "public" trust involved in Indian
lands because those lands are held in trust for specific Indian tribes and individuals. Recog-
nizing this factor, Congress expressly excluded Indian lands when public lands were studied
by the Public Land Law Review Commission. See Act of September 19, 1964, Section 10,
78 Stat. 982. Thus, for example, Indian lands are not subject to disposition under general
public land laws such as the homestead acts. See Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S.
110 (1919); Cramer v. United States, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
176. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra
Club v. Department of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The litigation in-
volved a request by the Sierra Club that the Department of Interior, acting through the
National Park Service, use its powers to prevent damage allegedly caused to Redwood Na-
tional Park from logging on private lands adjacent to the park. In the first opinion, the court
denied the government's motion to dismiss and alternative motion for summary judgment.
In doing so, the court found that there were "general fiduciary obligations of the Secretary of
the Interior" in regard to managing the public lands. 376 F. Supp. at 93. The court cited
Knight v. United States Land Assn., 142 U.S. 161 (1891), discussed in note 174, supra, Utah
Power & Light v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1916), which used trust language only in
passing; and Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1972), discussed in note 175 supra.
The court also relied upon the National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) and
the Redwood National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79j (1976). In the second opinion, the
court considered the merits of the case and ordered wide-ranging declaratory and injunctive
relief, directing the Department of Interior to take action to protect park resources. In a
third opinion, the court later found that the Department had taken the action required by
the injunction and released the government from the terms of the injunction. Sierra Club v.
Department of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In 1978, Congress added
some 48,000 acres of land to the Park. See, P.L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163 (1978).
177. Redwood National Park includes scattered parcels, many of which are very narrow.
In particular, the "Worm" area along Redwood Creek was little more than an extended
buffer zone. Numerous studies conducted by the National Park Service showed that
clearcutting of redwoods on steep slopes on adjacent private lands would cause severe ero-
sion, including slides in sotne areas, and would deteriorate water quality. In addition, the
remaining old growth redwoods in the park would be subject to wind throw after the adja-
cent trees on private lands were removed. See generally 389 F. Supp. 287-88.
178. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides that the purpose of the National Park System is "to
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to
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Act. 179 Both of these statutes contain language that can be read as im-
posing an express trust, rather than an implied trust that would apply
to the public lands generally. Finally, the fact remains that the leading
case, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,' may have involved former
public lands underlying public water, but the trustee in that case was a
state, not any federal entity. The Supreme Court has not based any
holding on the public trust doctrine since Illinois Central was decided
in 1892. There have been few lower court cases since Redwood Park.I I
The uncertain posture of the public trust doctrine on the public
lands today hardly means that Trust Review is inappropriate in the
evolving field of public land law. Elevated standards of judicial scru-
tiny have been applied, without express statutory direction, to such di-
verse entities as private trustees, 8 2 common carriers,18 3 superior parties
executing adhesion contracts, 8 4 and, as noted, to the role of the United
States in Indian law'8 5 and to the states' administration of land subject
to the public trust doctrine.'8 6 All of these doctrines developed as a
matter of common law. All developed because the courts recognized
that special subject matter was involved and highly protective judicial
treatment was essential.
There are compelling justifications for requiring a high degree of
administrative care and judicial scrutiny in the administration of the
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."
179. 16 U.S.C. § 79a (1976) provides that the purpose of the Redwood National Park is
"to preserve significant examples of the primeval coastal redwood . . .forests and the
streams and seashores with which they are associated for purposes of public inspiration,
enjoyment, and scientific study." Under the Act, the National Park Service is accorded spe-
cific management powers, including the powers "to acquire interests in land from, and to
enter into contracts and cooperative agreements, with, the owners of land on the periphery
of the Park .... Such actions are to be taken "in order to afford as full protection as is
reasonably possible to the timber, soil, and streams within the boundaries of the Park. .. ."
Id. On the powers of the National Park Service see Sax, Helpless Giants: The National
Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REv. 639 (1976).
180. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir.
1980) (discussed at notes 242-47 infra); Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594
F.2d 872, 890-92 (Ist Cir. 1979) (trust notions used as partial support for environmental
protection measures for oil drilling on outer continental shelf); United States v. Ruby Co.,
588 F.2d 697, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1978) (trust used asjustification for inapplicability of estoppel
against the federal government). When this article was in galleys, Sierra Club v. Andrus,
487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), appeal pending, was handed down. It held that the 1978
amendment to 16 U.S.C.A. § la-1 (West Supp. 1980) eliminated any non-statutory trust
duties of the National Park Service and that the Bureau of Land Management has no sepa-
rate trust duties apart from statute.
182. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 258, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) (Chief Justice
Cardozo).
183. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451 (1880).
184. See. e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966).
185. See note 175 supra.
186. See notes 167-70 supra.
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public lands. The recent dominant statutes in the field repeatedly un-
derscore the complex matrix of factors that, taken together, form the
overriding "national interest." '87 Although there is a dearth of clear
federal precedent on the subject, several state court decisions invoking
the public trust doctrine 88 easily lend themselves to application to the
public lands, which hold so much economic wealth and which are so
intertwined with our national spirit. And, as one scholar has noted in a
related context, strict judicial scrutiny of public resource issues "plays
no favorites; it is advanced as enthusiastically by industry as it is by
environmentalists." 189
Special rules tend to develop around special subject matter and the
public lands certainly qualify. We can expect further judicial develop-
ment of some form of Trust Review to test the decisions of public land
managers.
B. Judicial Construction of Congressional Intent: The Reserved
Rights Cases
Modem public lands statutes almost invariably carry with them a
rich and thorough legislative history. Views on different issues may
vary-indeed there may be an abundance of conflicting views-but
hardly a stone is left unturned by senators and representatives, congres-
sional staffers, administrative officials, and representatives of the many
special interest groups that invariably testify on legislative proposals.
In addition, modem public lands legislation, like modem legislation
generally, tends to be relatively specific. Often the tough issues are
compromised out in specific provisions in the statue itself.
A recurring problem in the field of public land law revolves
around the fact that older public lands statutes present little guidance
to the courts. Many of the dominant statutes in the field are marked by
a spareness that could exist only in a simpler, and perhaps happier,
time. 9° Similarly, the legislative history of the older statutes is fre-
quently skimpy. Today, as the volume of litigation multiplies, courts
are repeatedly faced with the task of analyzing broad statutory lan-
guage against a backdrop of legislative history that amounts to a blank
slate.
187. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976) (FLPMA); 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (1976) (National
Forest Management Act of 1976).
188. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d
114 (1966) (lease by state park management agency for large skiing development struck
down because of a lack of "clear or express statutory authorization"); United Plainsmen
Assn. v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976)
(public trust doctrine requires "some planning" and "analysis of present supply and future
need" before the State Engineer may issue water permits for large coal related power and
energy production facilities). See also note 167 supra.
189. Rodgers, .4 Hard Look at Vermont Yankee. Environmental Law Under Close Scru-
tiny, 67 GEO. L. J. 699, 706 (1979).
190. See text accompanying notes 5-10 supra.
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A number of recent cases involving federal reserved rights demon-
strate the need for canons of construction that will allow courts to ap-
proach public lands statutes with a reasonable degree of uniformity
and predictability. United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 191 in-
volved an attempt by the railroad to drill for oil and gas on the right-
of-way granted to it by section 2 of the Union Pacific and Central Pa-
cific Railroad Act of 1862.192 There was no express federal mineral
reservation in section 2, dealing with the right-of-way. However, sec-
tion 3 of the statute did provide for a reservation of minerals by the
United States by specifying that "all mineral lands shall be excepted
from the operation of this act." 193 As the dissent demonstrated, 194 there
was good reason to believe that the mineral reservation language was
not intended to apply to the right-of-way itself; rather, the provision in
section 3 may well have been intended only as a directive to the Secre-
tary of Interior to make a determination of the mineral character of the
alternate sections also granted to the railroad'95 and, if known mineral
land existed, to provide "in lieu" selections for those alternate sections
containing minerals. 196 However, Justice Douglas, writing for the ma-
jority, concluded that the federal mineral reservation applied to the
right-of-way as well as to the grant of alternate sections. He reasoned
that any other construction would assume that the Thirty-Seventh Con-
gress was "profligate"'197 and that Congress intended to "endow the
railroad with the untold riches underlying the right-of-way."'
198
The fact, of course, is that Congress was in many ways "profligate"
with the public lands during the 19th century' 99 and seemingly did in-
191. 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
192. Act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489, 491.
193. Id.
194. 353 U.S. at 120-37.
195. The 1862 Act provided that, in addition to the grant of the right-of-way on which
the line would be located, a grant would be made of the alternate, odd-numbered sections of
land for ten miles on each side of the tracks. See note 192 supra. The Act was amended in
1864 to provide for grants of alternate sections for twenty miles in both directions. Act of
July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 356.
196. The Court had earlier held that minerals under patented land were not reserved by
the government if minerals were subsequently discovered on such lands after the Secretary's
initial determination of non-mineral character had been made. Burke v. Southern Pacific R.
Co., 234 U.S. 669 (1914).
197. 353 U.S. at 117.
198. Id. at 116.
199. Congress generally sought to open the West to settlement during the 19th and early
20th centuries through a broad based program of subsidies to the settlers: free land to the
railroads, nearly free land to the homesteaders, free minerals to miners, free grazing to
ranchers, and below-market water to irrigators under the reclamation acts. Obviously, Con-
gress' program succeeded and had the beneficial purpose of opening vast new lands to the
expanding population. On the other hand, the project was so great that it was virtually
impossible to administer the program effectively, with the result that fraud and sharp deal-
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tend to endow the railroads with untold riches.2°° Such incentives
seemed necessary at the time in order to promote the settling of the
West. The following observation, though not made in regard to any of
the railroad acts, probably reflects the mood of the time far better than
Douglas' conclusions:
[If we do not open the West] these prairies with their gorgeous
growth of flowers, their green carpeting, their lovely lawns
and gentle slopes, will for centuries continue to be the home
of the wild deer and wolf; their stillness will be undisturbed
by the Jocund song of the farmer, and fertile soil unbroken by
the ploughshare. Something must be done to remedy this
evil.201
Douglas was a bad historian but a good judge. The statute was not
clear on its face as to the mineral reservation, and there was no legisla-
tive history directly on point. As a result, he relied upon a fundamental
rule of construction in public land law: "if there are doubts they are to
be resolved for the government, not against it."'202 Because these were
national resources, Douglas assumed that Congress was prudent and
that it was careful to preserve the nation's assets.
The Ninth Circuit followed the same approach in United States v.
Union Oil Co.2 °3 A homestead had been patented under the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act of 191 620 and the patent included a reserva-
tion by the United States of "all coal and other minerals." The home-
stead at issue contained "The Geysers" in northern California, an area
of valuable geothermal resources. The court found that the elements in
a geothermal system-magma, porous rock, strata, and water-are all
"minerals" and therefore the geothermal system had been reserved. 20 5
There was no express intent in the legislative history of the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act to reserve geothermal resources-the commer-
hig abounded. See, e.g., P. GATES, supra note 41, at 47-82, and S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX,
supra note 41, at 24, 35-36, 47-50, 81.
200. The railroads grants totaled more than 131 million acres. Ninety-four million acres
went directly to the railroads and an additional 37 million acres were granted to states for
the benefit of the railroads. See, e.g., S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, supra note 41, at 19-20.
201. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess., 52 (remarks of Rep. Orlando B. Ficklin of
Illinois).
202. 353 U.S. at 116.
203. 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsub nom. Ottoboni v. United States, 435
U.S. 911 (1977). See also Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654 (D. Wyo.
1979).
204. 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302 (1976) (repealed by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Tit. 7, § 702 Pub. L.
94-579, 90 Stat. 2787).
205. On development of geothermal resources see Olpin, Tarlock & Austin, Geothermal
Development and Western Water Law, 1979 UTAH L. Rnv. 773. Water is an integral part of
the geothermal resource, which was held reserved in Union OiL Water is not, however, a
mineral for purposes of the Hardrock Mining Act of 1872. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone
Products Co., Inc., 436 U.S. 604 (1978).
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cial development of geothermal energy was not contemplated at the
time. The court, however, construed the Act and the patent in favor of
the United States2"6 and held that geothermal resources were reserved.
As in Union Pacific, the court applied a fiction: by looking to Congress'
"general purpose" of keeping subsurface mineral resources for public
ownership and conservation,20 7 the court implicitly found that Con-
gress intended to be highly protective of federal resources and to retain
them in federal hands. The result in both cases is to impute to Con-
gress an intention to promote sound national development and conser-
vation of federal resources.
The third major reserved rights case is Leo Sheep Co. v. United
States.20 8 Congress has granted odd-numbered sections near Seminoe
Reservoir in Wyoming to the Union Pacific Railroad in 1862.209 The
United States had retained the even-numbered sections, thus creating a
"checkerboard" ownership pattern. The Leo Sheep Company had suc-
ceeded to the railroad's ownership of the odd-numbered parcels. The
Bureau of Land Management built a dirt road to the reservoir, neces-
sarily crossing the corners of some of Leo Sheep's sections. The princi-
pal question was whether the United States had impliedly reserved an
easement, for which no compensation would be paid, across the odd-
numbered sections to provide access for public recreation at Seminoe
Reservoir.210 The Court referred to the rule that grants from the
United States should be construed in favor of the United States but
refused to apply the maxim with "full vigor" because railroad grants
are "quasi-public" and stand on a higher plane than "private
grants."' 21' The Court did not discuss Union Pacfic, where the Court
had earlier applied the liberal rule in favor of the United States to the
same statute.21 2 The Court then held that the implied easement had
not been reserved on the primary ground that "the easement is not ac-
206. 549 F.2d at 1273 n.5.
207. Id. at 1275.
208. 440 U.S. 668 (1979). The case is analyzed in Note, Problems in Acquiring Access to
Public Lands Across Intervening Private Lands. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 15 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 119 (1980) and in Note, Was an Easement by Necessity Impliedly Reserved in
the Checkerboard Land Grants.: Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 1 PUBLIC LAND LAW RE-
VIEW 112 (1980).
209. The Act is discussed in notes 195 and 196 supra. The Act had earlier been con-
strued in United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 353 U.S. 112 (1957), discussed at notes 191-
202 supra.
210. The United States also argued that an easement had been reserved by the doctrine
of easement by necessity and that the right to cross private lands was a privilege recognized
by the Unlawful Enclosures Act of 1885, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1976). The Court rejected
both arguments. 400 U.S. at 681 and 685.
211. 440 U.S. at 682-83, citing United States v. Denver and Rio Grande R. Co., 151 U.S.
1, 14 (1893).
212. See notes 191-202 supra.
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tually a matter of necessity in this case because the government has the
power of eminent domain."
21 3
Leaving aside the surprising failure even to cite Union Pacfc, the
specific result in the Leo Sheep litigation is supportable. Following the
above analysis, the Court should have assumed that Congress' purpose
was to act as a prudent manager of federal resources. Recreation is a
federal resource214 but there was no overriding need to imply a reserva-
tion for access to that resource-access can be obtained, although with
some administrative inconvenience, by exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain.21 ' Since the implied easement by reservation would be of
limited value to the United States in the management of its resources,
there is no compelling justification for impressing implied easements,
with no compensation to private landowners, on tens of millions of
acres of western lands.
2 16
The fact that the United States does not hold the reserved ease-
ment argued for in Leo Sheep should not control the related issue of
whether individual members of the public have implied licenses to
-cross private lands to use checkerboarded public lands. An earlier case,
Buford v. Houtz,2 17 had upheld such implied licenses, finding that pri-
vate ranchers had the right to herd their sheep across private lands in
order to graze on public lands.2 8 The Court in Leo Sheep did not
overrule Buford v. Houtz but rather distinguished it on the ground that
the ranchers' access in Buford was supported by "custom and neces-
sity." '2 19 The opinion in Leo Sheep also emphasized that the BLM was
asserting a wideranging power to "construct public thoroughfares with-
out compensation." 220 Whether there will be different results in future
cases involving access over trails or lesser roads by hunters, fishers,
ranchers, miners, and other customary users of public lands remains to
be resolved.22'
213. 440 U.S. at 680.
214. See notes 234-36 infra.
215. 440 U.S. at 680. The BLM does have legal authority to acquire such rights-of-way;
the actual expenditure of federal funds to obtain the necessary real property interests is not
likely to be great, but BLM administrators indicate that time-consuming planning and sur-
veying is involved. See Note, Problems in Acquiring Access to Public Lands Across Interven-
ing Private Lands: Leo Sheep Co. v. UnitedStates, 15 LAND & WATER L. REv. 119, 130-33
(1980).
216. 440 U.S. at 685.
217. 113 U.S. 320 (1890).
218. See also Mackay v. Uinta Development Co., 219 F. 116 (8th Cir. 1914).
219. 440 U.S. at 687 n.24. Similarly, the Court declined to overrule Camfield v. United
States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), upholding federal power to prohibit private fencing that limited
access by ranchers to checkerboard public lands.
220. Id. at 687.
221. One recent decision, though it deals with a construction of the Surface Resources
and Multiple-Use Act of 1955, stands for broad public access to the federal lands for recrea-
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The reasoning in the fourth reserved rights case, United States v.
New Mexico,22 2 cannot be so easily justified. The question was
whether the reservation of land for the Gila National Forest in New
Mexico impliedly reserved instream flows in the Mimbres River for
wildlife preservation, recreation, aesthethic purposes, and stock water-
ing. The most important statute was the Forest Service Organic Act of
1897,223 which defined the purposes for which national forests were to
be established. Congress did not expressly reserve water in the 1897
Act, but the statute provided that the purposes of the national forests
were "to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, [and to]
securfe] favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continu-
ous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United
States .... ,,zz As in the other three cases, the result turned on the
intent that should properly be imputed to Congress.
United States v. New Mexico is a close and difficult case. The
quarrel here is with the method of statutory construction used by the
Court.z25 In finding no implied reservation for wildlife and recreation,
the Organic Act was effectively construed strictly against the United
States. 26 The accepted approach, however, is to construe federal reser-
tion. See United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980), dis-
cussed in notes 242-47 infra.
222. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The most thorough analysis of the opinion is Fairfax and
Tarlock, No Waterfor the Woods.- A Critical Analysis of United States v. New Mexico, 15
IDAHO L. REV. 511 (1979). See also Note, Reserved Water Rights on National Forests After
United States v. New Mexico, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 609; Case Comment, Water Rights and
National Forests-Narrowing the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 40 OHIO S. L. J. 729 (1979).
The litigation is also discussed in Note, New Mexico's National Forests and the Implied Res-
ervation Doctrine, NAT. RESOURCES J. 975 (1976), which was written before the Supreme
Court decision.
Following the decision in United States v. New Mexico, the solicitor's office of the De-
partment of Interior issued Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914 (June 25, 1979) on the extent of
reserved water rights on non-Indian federal lands. The opinion is discussed in Freudenthal,
Federal Non-Reserved Water Rights, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 67 (1980). See generally
Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How it Grew. Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of
Water, 1975 BYU L. REv. 639; and Note, Water in the Woods: The Resered-Right Doctrine
and National Forests Lands, 20 STAN. L. Rv. 1187 (1968).
223. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-475, 477-482, 551 (1976). The Court also construed the 1891 Cre-
ative Act, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1976), which first authorized the President to set aside national
forests. The Gila National Forest, at issue in United States v. New Mexico, was reserved in
1899. 438 U.S. at 698.
224. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1976).
225. The Court's reading of the relevant legislative history is discussed and criticized in
Fairfax and Tarlock, supra note 222, at 533-49.
226. The Court made it clear that there was no question of Congress' ability to make the
reservation: "the question posed in this case... is a question of implied intent and not
power." 438 U.S. at 698. In construing the scope of the grant, the Court focused upon
language from Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976): "the Court has repeat-
edly emphasized that Congress reserved 'only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation, no more."' The Cappaert opinion also stated that intent to re-
[Vol. I
19801 FIELD OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
vations in favor of the United States.227 The Court should have ap-
plied that canon of construction and infused it with the notion that
Congress is prudent and foresighted-that Congress has a generalized
intent to protect public resources. Wildlife and recreation are impor-
tant federal resources.228 Unlike the implied easement for recreation
purposes in Leo Sheep, the reservation of water is essential to the pres-
ervation of the wildlife resource and cannot today be inexpensively ob-
tained by the United States. The approach suggested here would
support the reserved instream flows for wildlife advocated by the four
dissenting judges in United States v. New Mexio.2 2 9
These divergent opinions on federal reserved rights should be rec-
onciled so that judges will be able to operate from a common ground in
analyzing the extent of implied federal reservations of resources on the
public lands. First, the Supreme Court should adopt the unspoken but
implicit premise of the Union Pac'c 2 3° and Union Oi1231 opinions:
lacking clear legislative history, Congress should be presumed to have
considered all of the ramifications of its decisions and to have taken
serve water "is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish
the purposes for which the reservation was created." 426 U.S. at 139. In United States v. New
Mexico, the Court adopted, for the first time, a distinction between "primary purposes" and
"secondary purposes" of the reservation. The Court found that the primary purposes of the
1897 Act were only to furnish a continuous supply of timber to the nation and to maintain
national forests as watersheds to prevent floods and encourage stream flows for private water
users. Later, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528-531 (1976), did
expressly mention recreation, wildlife, and fish as being purposes for which the national
forests are established. The Court found that those purposes expressed in the 1960 Act were
only "secondary" and did not expand the two purposes-enhancement of water supply for
private users and timber preservation-that had been established in the 1897 Act. 438 U.S.
at 718.
227. See United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 353 U.S. 112 (1947), discussed at notes
191-202 supra United States v. Union Oil Co. 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsub
nom. Ottoboni v. United States, 435 U.S. 911 (1977), discussed at notes 203-07 supra, and
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979), discussed at notes 208-21 supra. It
should be noted that those cases involved a different kind of "reservation" than did United
States v. New Mexico. Union Pacifc, Union Oil, and Leo Sheep involved reservations by
the United States in bilateral transactions-railroad grants and homestead patents. Other
examples of reservations in bilateral transactions include transactions with the states and
with Indian tribes. United States v. New Mexico involved a "reservation" in a different
sense, namely the unilateral congressional reserving, or a setting aside, of public lands for a
specific purpose; the reservation of lands for national forests involved no party other than
the United States. This distinction would not seem to lead to a different judicial approach:
unilateral reservations and bilateral reservations both involve federal land use decisions
which, presumably, are made in the context of an overriding public interest. Furthermore,
although no private party is directly involved in the unilateral reservation of a national
forest, it is obvious from controversy in United States v. New Mexico that many nonfederal
interests are involved.
228. See text accompanying notes 233-38 infra.
229. 438 U.S. at 718-25.
230. 353 U.S. 112, discussed in text accompanying notes 191-202 supra.
231. 549 F.2d 1271, discussed in text accompanying notes 203-07 supra.
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whatever prudent action is appropriate for the reasonable, long-term
protection and preservation of the public lands and resources. Second,
courts should be quicker to recognize that the public lands offer wealth
other than traditional economic resources: timber, minerals, water, and
forage. Congress has long recognized that recreation and preservation
are valuable resources. 32 Federal wildlife law has deeper roots than is
commonly appreciated. 33 Recent public lands legislation has uni-
formly recognized the non-economic resources. 234 In FLPMA, Con-
gress likewise defined "resources" broadly2 35 and went further,
directing the administration to identify "new and emerging resource
and other values. 2 36 Congress, in other words, has squarely recog-
nized, as the dissenting opinion in United States v. New Mexico237 put
it, that the public lands are not "still, silent, lifeless places. . . [They]
consist of the birds, animals, and fish-the wildlife-that inhabit them,
as well as the trees, flowers, shrubs, and grasses.
238
Such an approach would give content to the public trust language
that has long been found in judicial opinions in the field of public land
law. 3 9 Just as the public trust doctrine can be relevant in judicial re-
view of agency action,2' trust theory can be valuable in analyzing
Congress' intent.24 ' If Congress is viewed as holding the public lands
and their resources as a trustee for the public, then congressional pur-
232. Yellowstone National Park was set aside in 1872, see note 40 supra, and Yosemite
National Park was established in 1891, Act of March 30, 1891, 26 Stat. 1565. By the turn of
the century, seven national parks had been set aside, G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra
note 2, at 206 and 46 million acres had been reserved from the public domain as forest
reserves. P. GATES supra note 41, at 580.
233. Hunting was prohibited in Yellowstone National Park in 1894, Act of May 7, 1894,
28 Stat. 73. The first wildlife refuge was established on Afognak Island in Alaska in 1892,
Proclamation No. 39, 27 Stat. 1052 (1892), and many other refuges followed in the early 20th
century. M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 126-27 (1977). On the
development of federal wildlife law, see generally id and Coggins, Federal Wildlife Law
Achieves Adolescence: Developments in the 1970s, 1978 DUKE L. J. 735.
234. See, e.g., the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 531 (1976)
(including recreation, fish and wildlife as resources); the National Forest Management Act
of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1) (1976) (requiring that planning include co-ordination with
recreation, wildlife and fish, and wilderness). Of course, the "non-economic" resources in
fact generate substantial economic activity in terms of user fees, license fees, and industries
supporting various forms of outdoor recreation.
235. 43 U.S.C § 1712(c) (1976) (including as "resources," recreation, wildlife and fish,
and "natural scenic, scientific, and historical values").
236. Id. at § 1711(a).
237. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
238. Id. at 719 (dissenting opinion).
239. See notes 171-76 supra.
240. See Section III A supra.
241. No suggestion is made here that the public trust doctrine operates as a substantive
constraint on Congress when exercising its broad power under the Property Clause. See text
at notes 79-83 supra. The doctrine can properly be used, however, to determine congres-
sional intent in implementing its constitutional authority.
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pose in ambiguous statutes can better be understood. If the duty is one
of a trustee, the courts should properly assume that Congress intended
to fulfill that duty in a prudent manner.
One recent case following this approach is United States v. Curtis-
Nevada Mines, Inc.242 Unpatented mining claims had been located
during 1970 and afterward. The Surface Resources and Multiple Use
Act of 1955,243 however, had provided that claims located after the pas-
sage of the Act would be subject to surface use by the United States
and "its permittees and licensees." The question was whether the
claims could be closed off to recreational users who had no specific
written licenses or permits.
The Curtis-Nevada court initially invoked trust concepts, finding
that "historically, the United States has managed the lands within the
public domain as fee owner and trustee for the people of the United
States." 2" Further, public lands have traditionally been left open for
public recreation without any license.24 5 Since there was no showing
that there had been any actual interference with mining operations by
the recreationists, 24 the Ninth Circuit was able to take a broad view of
the issues and reach a holding that reconciled the trust duty both to the
mining claimant and to the public at large:
The historical principle that no formal permission, permit, or
license is required for use of public lands for general recrea-
tional use or access to adjoining lands was formalized by the
Forest Service with regard to National Forests in 1942 ....
A similar policy of holding public lands open for recrea-
tional use has been followed by the Bureau of Land M~nage-
ment ....
These regulations confirm a traditional policy for the use
of public lands allowing the public to use lands within the
public domain for general recreational purposes without
holding a written, formal permit, except as to activities which
have been specifically regulated.
The Multiple Use Act was designed to open up the public
domain to greater, more varied uses. To require that anyone
desiring to use claimed lands for recreation must obtain a for-
mal, written license would greatly restrict and inhibit the use
of a major portion of the public domain.247
Thus the Ninth Circuit used the public trust to synthesize and rec-
oncile the clashes among resource uses that constantly recur in public
242. 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980).
243. 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-612 (1976).
244. 611 F.2d at 1283.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1286.
247. Id. at 1284-85.
19801
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
land law. The public trust doctrine forces analysis and balancing of the
interests of all users and all resources. Ultimately, in situations where
Congress has not spoken, the doctrine calls on courts to assume the best
of the national legislature: to presume that Congress considered all as-
pects of its responsibility to the public and that it took appropriate ac-
tion for long-term protection and preservation of the public lands and
resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the 1970's, public land law provided a fascinating study in
law, one that promises to continue. There was extensive legislative and
judicial oversight of issues normally left to the executive--complex
questions of technology, economics, and on-the-ground administration
of natural resources. Whatever rubric the respective institutions used,
•Congress and the federal courts acted for three basic reasons. First, the
public-industry, environmentalists, whatever--came to place a high
priority on the public lands and resources. Second, though the magni-
tude varied, there were administrative abuses. The coordinate
branches were reluctant to intervene-and they nearly always said so-
but they were moved to action.
Third, there developed a widely-accepted recognition that re-
sources on the public lands are too interrelated to allow for a narrow
view of decision-making. It is invariably a misnomer to refer to a wil-
derness proposal, or a mining issue, or a water project. One resource
use always implicates another and often several others. Congress, rec-
ognizing this broad range of philosophical views and relevant disci-
plines, called for increased public access to information,
interdisciplinary planning, public participation in decision-making,
and stricter judicial review. Similarly, litigation raised issues dealing
directly with the interrelatedness among the resources; in response, the
courts began to develop various doctrines. These emerging judicial
rules include the public trust doctrine and a canon of construction that
Congress presumptively intended to protect the public lands and re-
sources in situations involving resource conflicts.
These developments, together with the ever-present backdrop of
history, encompass all of the public lands and resources and provide a
context for analysis. Not answers, a context. The answers come only
incrementally for this is no easy or quick process. But the move toward
an ordered synthesis is a healthy, necessary, and significant step toward
eliminating the voids and inconsistencies that have existed for too long
on these lands that mean so much to the spirit and economy of the
nation.
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